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In the 2012 season finale of the television show Political Animals, the secretary 
of state, Elaine Barrish (Sigourney Weaver), learns that the vice president, 
Fred Collier (Dylan Baker), has asked the chief justice of the United States 
Supreme Court to administer the oath of office after Air Force One—with 
the president on board—goes down in French waters. Barrish, trained as a 
lawyer, is incredulous; why, she asks, is Collier not adhering to the Twenty-
fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution? An advisor wonders 
aloud about the amendment and she explains—for his benefit and ours—the 
constitutional procedure by which the vice president may inform congressional 
leaders that, with the support of a majority of the cabinet, he or she is assuming 
the powers of the presidency because the president has become incapacitated.1 
Barrish proceeds to persuade Collier that he should adhere to this procedure, 
secure the cabinet’s support, and not risk a constitutional crisis that would 
cloud his presumed tenure in office.
Perhaps needless to say, these scenes are like candy to a constitutional law 
professor. This is the stuff we rarely address in the basic con law course taught 
in most American law schools, the majority of which focuses on what Sanford 
Levinson, in Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance, calls the 
“Constitution of Conversation”—those provisions of the U.S. Constitution, 
such as the commerce clause and the due process clause, whose textual meaning 
is subject to seemingly endless debate among commentators, judges, lawyers 
and members of the public. Framed focuses instead on the provisions about 
which there is rarely any real debate about textual meaning—what Levinson 
calls the “Constitution of Settlement,” those self-enforcing constitutional 
provisions that “appear to be sufficiently obvious in their meaning that they 
require no adjudication at all” (22).
It is this lack of debate over legal meaning that makes understanding the 
dictates and implications of the Constitution of Settlement so critical for 
1. See U.S. Const., amend XXV, § 4.
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Levinson. In his view, the Constitution of Settlement is essentially responsible 
for the current crisis of governance in the United States; the “major premise” 
of Framed is “that there is a connection between the perceived deficiencies 
of contemporary government and formal constitutions” (5). Levinson argues 
that the rules embraced by the Constitution of Settlement have led to the 
dysfunction that describes national politics in the United States today, with a 
federal government equipped to do little more than lurch from crisis to crisis 
between bouts of partisan bickering. To make matters worse, the institutional 
deficiencies at the federal level created by the Constitution of Settlement are 
effectively immune to change, given that the courts rarely have occasion to 
address them and amending the constitution is close to impossible. 
To illustrate the force the Constitution of Settlement exerts on our 
politics and governance at the federal level, consider again the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, the provision concerning presidential succession that became a 
plot point in Political Animals. The amendment exemplifies the central theme of 
Framed: the Constitution of Settlement forces some options and curtails others 
without accounting for the needs and exigencies of modern governance. Its 
framers designed the amendment to address the “Kennedy problem”—that is, 
what might have happened if President John F. Kennedy “had survived for six 
weeks while slipping in and out of consciousness” (219). And the procedure 
outlined in the amendment seems adequate: should a president be shot and 
wounded in such a way that he loses consciousness, we know how to keep the 
office of the president running. But the amendment tells us nothing about a 
situation in which, say, a president suffers from a progressive mental illness, like 
Alzheimer’s disease. As Levinson notes, President Ronald Reagan likely was 
afflicted with that disease “no later than sometime in his second term in office,” 
yet “there was never a hint of recourse to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which 
suggests that it will take something truly extraordinary for the amendment to 
take on real life, as it were” (220).
Levinson’s point is not that the meaning of the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
is in any way unclear. Rather, he is arguing that its utility is fairly limited, 
neglecting as it does to take account of the ways in which a president is most 
likely to become disabled while in office and require removal. The amendment 
simply does not contemplate circumstances beyond its settled meaning. 
And we can’t place the blame for this one on the framers of the original 
Constitution—the amendment was ratified in 1967, by which time the possible 
means by which a President could become unfit for office surely included more 
than the risk of an assassin’s bullet. 
The Twenty-fifth is not the only constitutional amendment concerning the 
executive branch that gets Levinson’s attention in Framed. He asks: what if it 
would be a good idea for a particular president to stick around beyond two terms 
of four years apiece? The problem is not the term limitation per se “but instead 
that [the amendment] admits of no potential exceptions” (212). And, partly as 
a result of the Twenty-second amendment, the time in which a president can 
influence the direction of at least domestic policy has been reduced to about 
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two years—until the first major congressional election of his first term. “Sooner 
or later,” the journalist Ryan Lizza has concluded, “every reelected president 
confronts the frustration lurking in a second term: reelection to power does 
not necessarily grant more of it.”2 Further, as Levinson observes, “even if 
one likes the Twenty-second Amendment as a valuable protection against 
demagogues, it might be even better if, for example, Congress could suspend 
the amendment by a two-thirds vote when ‘the national interest requires it’” 
(212).
Levinson argues, moreover, that just as the Constitution of Settlement 
forecloses possibilities for responsible governance, it serves to thwart basic 
democratic impulses. Consider in this regard the method by which we choose 
our presidents. The Electoral College represents the framers’ “strong preference 
for representative government over any kind of direct decisionmaking by the 
people” (179). They determined it would be better for the chief executive to be 
elected, as Alexander Hamilton explained, not by the people but by “[a] small 
number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass, 
[who] will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite 
to so complicated an investigation.”3 
Hamilton’s is not the only explanation for the Electoral College. Relying 
upon the work of Akhil Amar,4 Levinson explains that, in 1787—a time when 
organized political parties did not exist as they do today—there was an 
information problem which recommended a system that turned on the popular 
election of local elites to serve as presidential electors. Further, direct election 
of the president by the people would have eliminated the benefit to the slave 
states that secured their commitment to the new constitution: the Three-fifths 
Compromise, which increased these states’ populations and therefore their 
representation in Congress, not only “gave slaveowners extra influence in the 
House of Representatives,” but “a bonus when choosing the president,” which 
became a “Jim Crow” bonus after the Civil War (183).
Regardless of its origins and intended function, the Electoral College 
undeniably diminishes the scope of American democracy. The mechanism 
of choosing the president through the college gives to states the power to 
determine the method by which electors will be selected, and the states in the 
late 18th century—like most today—were guided by partisan interest. “Among 
other things,” Levinson writes, the Electoral College created “an incentive [for 
states] to adopt the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes, lest 
they in effect lose clout in the final vote by more accurately reflecting the actual 
distribution of the local citizenry’s preferences” (183). 
2. Ryan Lizza, The Second Term: What would Obama do if reelected?, The New Yorker, June 
18, 2012, at 46.
3. The Federalist No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., The New 
American Library 1961).
4. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (Random House 2005).
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It should come as no surprise, moreover, that the Electoral College is in 
its way a very peculiar institution. Levinson notes that “no foreign country 
chooses its presidents in such a byzantine way” and, closer to home, “all 
American states elect their governors by direct vote of the people” (189). In 
this respect, as in many others, Levinson seeks to contrast the decisions of the 
framers of the original constitution with the decisions of the framers of the 
50 other constitutions that fill out the subtitle of Framed. He believes we can 
learn a great deal from the varied structural and institutional choices reflected 
in the state constitutions, and takes seriously the notion that these documents 
should be accorded respect both as constitutions and as alternative models of 
constitutional democracy.5
The direct election of chief executives is just one example of state 
constitutional difference; throughout Framed Levinson discusses other ways in 
which state governments differ from their federal counterpart. For instance, 
in most states the attorney general is independent of the governor: more than 
40 states elect their attorneys general, in a few the state legislature selects the 
attorney general, and Tennessee Supreme Court appoints that state’s attorney 
general. And “even though New Jersey attorneys general are appointed by the 
governor,” Levinson notes, “they do not, unlike other executive branch officials 
in that state, serve at the pleasure of the chief executive. Once appointed, the 
attorney general is entitled to remain in office for the term of the governor” 
(240). What most state constitutions create, then, is the possibility of tension 
between a governor and an attorney general—and, of course, of additional 
oversight. This is so even when the two come from the same party, should the 
attorney general harbor gubernatorial ambitions. The relationship between 
presidents and the attorneys general they have appointed, on the other hand, 
appears to create incentives for the latter “to subordinate their independent 
judgment to the political imperatives of the White House” (240-41).
Framed’s analysis of the Constitution of Settlement is not limited to 
questions about the constitutional configuration of and limitations on the 
executive branch. Levinson is convinced that the framers of the original 
constitution thoroughly boxed us in. For instance, “[w]e have a constitution 
filled with veto points, and among the most important of these is the ability 
of … [the] Senate to kill any and all legislation it finds unacceptable” (47). 
Thus the very accountability mechanisms that the Constitution of Settlement 
firmly establishes also “may assure the near inability to make decisions at all 
about important issues of public policy” (50). And, to make matters worse, 
the phenomenal rise of political parties, which the framers of the original 
5. Levinson also considers foreign constitutional precedent to be worthy of attention, but his 
comparative constitutional analysis relies most heavily on state constitutions: “[W]e should 
regard as an intellectual scandal,” he writes, “the systematic disregard of the rich array 
of American state constitutions and the lessons they might teach us, for good or for ill” 
(389).  See also Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State 
Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 813, 822 (2011) (arguing that law 
teachers should “recognize that we are collectively disserving our students … if we fail to 
inform them of the potential relevance of state constitutions to their practices”).
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constitution could scarcely have contemplated, has made the institutional 
structures they designed into nearly-perfect machines for preserving the status 
quo. There is more—much more—in Framed dissecting the Constitution of 
Settlement, but these examples convey the breadth of Levinson’s criticism.
Assuming Levinson is right about the Constitution of Settlement—and he 
does score some points—what can be done? Elections are probably not the 
answer: he demonstrates that, thanks to the provisions in the Constitution of 
Settlement that dictate how our representatives shall be elected, the weight of 
an individual’s vote is more a function of geography than equity, “determined 
by whether you happen to live in a district composed overwhelmingly of 
adult retirees or in a bedroom suburb where half the population is too young 
to vote” (108). In this way national elections are distorted, according more 
power to some citizens and less to others depending upon factors—like where 
one chooses to live—that most of us would probably regard as illegitimate. 
As Levinson argued in an earlier book, Our Undemocratic Constitution,6 ordinary 
politics cannot solve the larger problems of governance that the Constitution 
of Settlement creates; he accordingly repeats in Framed the call for a “new 
constitutional convention, one that could engage in a comprehensive overview 
of the U.S. Constitution and the utility of its many provisions to 21st century 
Americans” (391). 
Mindful of the “discussions with family and friends” that revealed doubts 
about the prospect of a new constitutional convention, Levinson anticipates 
most readers will reflexively reject such a proposal, if only because “they 
are basically terrified of what might happen if their fellow citizens, however 
selected, actually embarked on serious reflection about the Constitution with 
the possibility of changing it should they find it inadequate” (392). He could 
be right about this, yet it’s worth noting (and Levinson does) that such anxiety 
does not prevent many citizens from participating in the processes of state 
constitutional change—49 states, after all, have adopted some means through 
which citizens can effect constitutional change and nearly every state election 
brings with it proposals for new amendments. As in so many other areas, the 
difficulty in amending the U.S. Constitution makes it an outlier among the 51 
American constitutions.
Another serious obstacle to a new federal constitutional convention is 
complacency among the citizenry—the view that no constitutional change 
is necessary because our political-governmental system, despite its many 
idiosyncrasies, works just fine most of the time. The power of Levinson’s book 
as a call to action—to persuade readers that modern problems of governance 
in the United States may be traced to constitutional decisions the framers 
necessarily tailored to the needs of 1787—depends upon readers sharing in 
the belief that there are indeed problems of governance that we should be 
addressing, and soon. If you don’t believe that contemporary American 
politics, at least at the federal level, has become unremittingly dysfunctional, 
6. Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong 
(and How the People Can Correct It) (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
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you’re likely not going to be supportive of a proposal for a new constitutional 
convention.
That the prospect of a new federal constitutional convention seems so 
remote may help to explain why the public and the commentariat focus much 
of their attention, much of the time, on the Constitution of Conversation. 
In the constitutional provisions that embrace some of the framers’ highest 
aspirations—for due process, equality, and the freedom of expression—lay a 
world of interpretive possibility unavailable in the Constitution of Settlement. 
This possibility for change underlies, for example, the popularity of efforts to 
address the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Citizens United case,7 involving 
the limits government can place on corporate political speech. That decision 
has become a symbol of the corrosive influence of money on politics and, 
because it springs from the Constitution of Conversation, many people believe 
something can be done about it: free speech being a contestable proposition, 
there are more than a few avenues for doctrinal evolution available to a future 
Supreme Court concerned about the effects of uncabined corporate political 
speech.
This is not to say that convincing the Court to reconsider Citizens United 
should be seen as a simple task—except, perhaps, as compared to convincing 
a majority of Americans that a new constitutional convention is in order. 
Our faith in and allegiance to the constitution of 1787 knows no bounds. 
Partisan political fighting and the constraints imposed by the Constitution of 
Settlement have been set aside in recent memory only in the face of national 
emergencies—the attacks of September 11 and the financial crisis of 2008, both 
of which required immediate action by the federal government—and even then 
in relatively limited fashion. Support for a new constitutional convention might 
not take hold absent a disaster of such magnitude that it makes transparent the 
cramped ability of our federal government actually to govern. Only in that 
unfortunate circumstance are we likely to appreciate Levinson’s counsel: to 
revisit the deal to which the framers of the original constitution agreed and 
take a good look at the other 50 American constitutions, to see what lessons 
we can learn from the laboratories of democracy that together comprise the 
United States.
7. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
